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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case comes on before this court on an appeal from 
an order of the district court entered on November 22, 
2000, denying a motion for class certification filed by 
plaintiffs Margaret Johnston and Paul Fontaine. The 
plaintiffs were investors in Cinema Plus, a limited 
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partnership formed to finance the production of motion 
pictures. They claim that the defendants made several 
fraudulent misrepresentations in the marketing of Cinema 
Plus, alleging various violations of the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. SS 1961- 
1968, and state law claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion for 
class certification which the district court, adopting the 
report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, denied. 
For the following reasons, we will affirm the district court's 




Cinema Plus, a limited partnership, was formed in 
Delaware in 1987 to produce and distribute feature-length 
motion pictures. Defendants HBO Film Management, Inc. 
and Entertainment Finance Services, Inc. were general 
partners of Cinema Plus and, according to plaintiffs' 
complaint, defendant Home Box Office, Inc. was a"de facto" 
general partner of Cinema Plus. Defendants Kidder, 
Peabody & Co., Inc. and Smith Barney, Inc. marketed 
interests in Cinema Plus to the public. 
 
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants made material 
misrepresentations in marketing interests in Cinema Plus. 
Specifically, the complaint claims that the brokers 
distributed uniform marketing materials to their sales 
representatives which, among other things, emphasized 
Michael Douglas's participation in the production of films, 
but failed to disclose that he was not under contract to 
produce any films for Cinema Plus.1 See App. at 1398-1400 
(amended compl. P 21); id. at 1403-04 (amended compl. 
P 32). For instance, the marketing materials included such 
statements as: 
 
       `Hell Drivers' to be produced by Michael 
       Douglas/Michael Phillips, will be the first partnership 
       production. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The remainder of the amended complaint is devoted to allegations of 
misrepresentations regarding the relative risks involved in investing in 
Cinema Plus. See App. at 1395-98. The plaintiffs, however, say very little 
about these claims on this appeal, apparently choosing instead to focus 
on their misrepresentation claims regarding Michael Douglas. 
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       Michael Douglas is the hottest name in Hollywood 
       today, both as an actor who just won an Academy 
       Award and a producer. He has just announced his 
       newest production, `Hell Drivers,' and we own it!! That 
       kind of sizzle will get every client's attention. 
 
       Investors `could more than double [their] money' or 
       `earn a multiple of their investment' in three years 
       through films produced by Michael Douglas, Michael 
       Phillips, and Aaron Russo. 
 
       You know that Michael Douglas is one of the hottest 
       producers today in the movie business. But did you 
       know who was going to finance his next production? 
       You are. 
 
       Michael Douglas does not realize his profits as a 
       producer until the investor has been made whole. 
 
       Upside potential is a multiple of investment in three 
       years through films by Michael Douglas, Michael 
       Phillips, Aaron Russo and other top producers. 
 
Id. at 1427-30. Similarly, the prospectus wrapper, a 
summary of information contained in the prospectus 
distributed to the brokers, included such statements as: 
 
       The Partnership has already signed three outstanding 
       producers: Michael Douglas, Michael Phillips and 
       Aaron Russo. 
 
       Cinema Plus has already contracted with three leading 
       producers: Michael Douglas . . . , Michael Phillips . . . , 
       and Aaron Russo . . . . 
 
       Cinema Plus, L.P. is committed to working exclusively 
       with successful producers; only those with commercial 
       track records will produce the Partnership's films. The 
       Partnership has already signed Agreements with 
       Michael Phillips and Michael Douglas, through their 
       partnership, Mercury/Douglas Films . . . . 
 
       The producers already under contract to the 
       Partnership are responsible for a succession of hits 
       that have helped fuel revenue growth in the motion 
       picture industry. 
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Id. at 106-07; id. at 111. The sales representatives 
purportedly relied upon these materials and represented to 
the plaintiffs that Michael Douglas would produce two to 
four films for Cinema Plus. The brokers, however, did not 
disclose the alleged falsity of their statements. 
 
Further, the plaintiffs claim written materials distributed 
to the investors, namely the prospectus, created a false and 
misleading impression, not otherwise rebutted, that Michael 
Douglas was committed to produce films for Cinema Plus. 
The prospectus states, in relevant part, that: 
 
       The Partnership has contracted for Michael S. Phillips 
       and Michael Douglas to render producing services for 
       a minimum of two and a maximum of four feature- 
       length motion pictures for the Partnership. 
 
       . . . 
 
       Either Mr. Phillips and/or Mr. Douglas will be actively 
       involved in a production capacity in all phases of 
       production of all Partnership Films produced under the 
       Mercury/Douglas Agreement. 
 
Id. at 158, 173. The plaintiffs allege they relied 
detrimentally on their brokers' misrepresentations and 
omissions of material information as well as those in the 
prospectus, in investing in Cinema Plus. 
 
In fact, Michael Douglas did not produce any films for 
Cinema Plus, although the limited partnership did finance 
and market four films. The films were largely unsuccessful 
financially, however, resulting in a loss for the partnership, 
and ultimately, this lawsuit. 
 
The plaintiffs' original complaint stated four counts, 
alleging one claim arising under RICO, with the predicate 
offenses of securities fraud, and state law claims for breach 
of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation and deceptive 
business practices. The defendants filed motions to dismiss 
the complaint which, in a report and recommendation filed 
on January 30, 1996, a magistrate judge recommended be 
granted. After objections were filed, the district court 
adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations and 
granted the defendants' motions. The plaintiffs then 
appealed to this court. 
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On appeal, we reversed the district court's order as we 
found that the facts alleged in the complaint stated a claim 
under RICO. See Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc. , 129 
F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1997) (table). In our opinion, we 
summarized the plaintiffs' claims: 
 
       In short, plaintiffs allege that the appellees 
       misrepresented that Cinema Plus was a safe and 
       prudent investment when, in reality, (1) its primary 
       purpose was to generate large commissions and fees 
       and create opportunities for self-dealing for the 
       defendants and (2) the `protection' of the [Assured 
       Return of Film Payments] was merely an illusory 
       benefit that obfuscated the risky nature of the 
       investment defendants were marketing. 
 
Appellants' Br. Ex. A at 3 (magistrate judge's report & 
recommendation). We, however, expressly did not address 
the plaintiffs' claims regarding misrepresentations about 
Michael Douglas's participation in Cinema Plus, finding 
them to be outside the scope of our analysis. See id. at 3-4. 
 
On remand, the defendants filed renewed motions to 
dismiss, which the district court denied. Thereafter, 
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging the same four 
counts. Then, they filed a motion for class certification, 
which, in a report and recommendation filed October 18, 
2000, the magistrate judge recommended be denied. On 
November 22, 2000, the district court adopted the 
recommendation and denied the plaintiffs' motion. 
 
Therefore, on December 7, 2000, plaintiffs filed a petition 
for permission to appeal from denial of class certification, 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). By order dated December 
29, 2000, a motions panel of this court denied plaintiffs' 
petition. See App. at 32. Then, on January 16, 2001, 
plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing. On March 15, 2001, 
the motions panel vacated its earlier order and referred 
plaintiffs' petition to a merits panel. See id.  at 20. 
Thereafter, on August 1, 2001, in light of our decision in 
Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 
00-1586, ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 877524, at * 1-3 (3d Cir. 
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In assessing whether the district court erred in denying 
plaintiffs' motion for class certification, we apply the abuse 
of discretion standard.3 See In re LifeUSA Holding Co., Inc., 
242 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir. 2001); Holmes v. Pension Plan 
of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 136 (3d Cir. 2000). 
A district court abuses its discretion if its decision " `rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.' " Newton, 2001 WL 877524, at *3 (quoting In re Gen. 
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 
F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
 
To obtain class certification, plaintiffs must establish all 
four elements of Rule 23(a) along with one provision of Rule 
23(b). See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 
624 (3d Cir. 1996); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 
239, 248 (3d Cir. 1975). Rule 23(a) requires a showing of: 
(1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) 
adequacy of representation.4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In 1998, the Supreme Court added a provision to Rule 23, governing 
class actions, permitting interlocutory appeal of decisions granting or 
denying class certification at a court of appeals' discretion. Recently, 
in 
Newton, we considered the standards for granting a petition to appeal 
class certification decisions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). See Newton, 
2001 
WL 877524, at * 1-3. We indicated that a petition to appeal should be 
granted to permit the court to address "the possible case-ending effect of 
an imprudent class certification decision (the decision is likely 
dispositive 
of the litigation)," or an erroneous ruling by the district court, or 
where 
review would facilitate development of the law on class certification. Id. 
at *3. Additionally, inasmuch as the court has the authority to grant or 
deny petitions "on the basis of any consideration that [it] finds 
persuasive," Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) committee note, the court may exercise 
its discretion and grant interlocutory review outside of these 
circumstances should it find other valid reasons for doing so. See id. 
 
3. The district court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1331 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(e) 
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). 
4. Rule 23(a) provides: 
 
       One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
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Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613, 117 
S.Ct. 2231, 2245 (1997). If these requirements are satisfied, 
the court also must find that the class action is 
maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2) or (3). See Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(b). In this case, the plaintiffs sought certification 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that "questions of 
law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of 
the controversy." Id. 
 
In analyzing plaintiffs' motion, the magistrate judge 
found that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the"predominance" 
requirement for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). The 
district court did not address expressly the certification 
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) or the superiority 
element of Rule 23(b)(3). Nevertheless, because satisfaction 
of each of the Rule 23 criteria is a necessary prerequisite to 
class certification we address each criterion in turn. 
 




To begin, proper class certification requires a finding of 
numerosity, or that the putative class is "so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a)(1). Here, inasmuch are there are thousands of 
potential class members, joinder would be impracticable, 




Second, the district court must find commonality, or that 
"there are questions of law or fact common to the class." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so 
       numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there 
are 
       questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or 
       defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
       defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will 
fairly 
       and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Commonality does not require an 
identity of claims or facts among class members; instead, 
"[t]he commonality requirement will be satisfied if the 
named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law 
with the grievances of the prospective class." In re the 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig. , 148 F.3d 
283, 310 (3d Cir. 1998); Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 
56 (3d Cir. 1994). In this case inasmuch as the question of 
whether the defendants fraudulently misrepresented the 
role of Michael Douglas in Cinema Plus is a factual and 





Third, in a properly certified class, the claims of the class 
representatives must be typical of the class as a whole. See 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 310. In considering the typicality 
issue, the district court must determine whether"the 
named plaintiff[s'] individual circumstances are markedly 
different or . . . the legal theory upon which the claims are 
based differs from that upon which the claims of other 
class members will perforce be based." Eisenberg v. 
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 786 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal 
quotations omitted). This criteria does not require that all 
putative class members share identical claims. Indeed, so 
long as "the claims of the named plaintiffs and putative 
class members involve the same conduct by the defendant, 
typicality is established regardless of factual differences." 
Newton, 2001 WL 877524, at *17 (citing Barnes v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 141 (3d Cir. 1998)); Baby Neal, 
43 F.3d at 58 ("Commentators have noted that cases 
challenging the same unlawful conduct which affects both 
the named plaintiffs and the putative class usually satisfy 
the typicality requirement irrespective of the varying fact 
patterns underlying the individual claims."). Here, because 
the claims of the plaintiffs and the putative class members 
all arise from the alleged misrepresentations by the 
defendants, the claims of the plaintiffs are typical of those 
of the class. 
 
4. Adequacy of Representation 
 
Fourth, class representatives must "fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 
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In analyzing this criteria, the court must determine whether 
the representatives' interests conflict with those of the class 
and whether the class attorney is capable of representing 
the class. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-26, 117 S.Ct. at 
2250-51; Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 & n.13, 
102 S.Ct. 2364, 2371 & n.13 (1982); Newton, 2001 WL 
877524, at *18. Under the facts as described by the parties, 
there are no foreseeable conflicts between the named and 
putative plaintiffs. Further, there is no reason to conclude 
that counsel would not suitably represent the class. 
Accordingly, we find that this criterion, and therefore all of 
the elements of Rule 23(a), are met. 
 
B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) 
 
Class certification also must satisfy the requirements of 
Rule 23(b), specifically here the predominance and 
superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Predominance 
requires "that questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
Superiority mandates that the district court determine that 
the class action is the best method of fairly and efficiently 
resolving the controversy. See id. To assist the court in 
analyzing cases for predominance and superiority, Rule 
23(b)(3) includes a nonexclusive list of relevant factors to 
consider: 
 
       (A) the interest of members of the class in individually 
       controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
       actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation 
       concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
       against members of the class; (C) the desirability or 
       undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the 
       claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely 
       to be encountered in the management of a class action. 
 
Id. Overall, as we have recognized repeatedly, "[i]ssues 
common to the class must predominate over individual 
issues, and the class action device must be superior to 
other means of handling the litigation." Newton, 2001 WL 
877524, at *19; Prudential, 148 F.3d at 313-14. 
 





The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class 
certification based on its conclusion that individual issues 
predominated over issues common to the class. See 
Appellants' Br. Ex. A at 7 (magistrate judge's report & 
recommendation). The court found that while the complaint 
alleged that the prospectus and prospectus wrapper 
contained representations that Michael Douglas would 
produce between two and four movies for Cinema Plus, the 
evidence indicated the plaintiffs' claims actually were based 
on alleged oral misrepresentations.5 See id. The question, 
then, was whether affirmative misrepresentations were 
made to particular investors, an inquiry that necessarily 
involves an individual review of what each investor was told 
and what information was provided. See id. at 8. To that 
end, the case was distinguishable from Prudential, 148 F.3d 
283, where we upheld the certification of a class alleging 
fraudulent insurance sales practices. See Appellants' Br. 
Ex. A at 8 (magistrate judge's report & recommendation). 
Moreover, because the plaintiffs claimed affirmative oral 
misrepresentations, as opposed to omissions, determining 
reliance necessarily required an individualized assessment. 
See id. Finally, because issues of reliance and causation 
predominated in the case, there would be "insurmountable 
manageability problems" if it proceeded to trial. Id. at 9. 
 
The soundness of the district court's decision turns on 
two considerations: first, whether it was appropriate to look 
beyond the plaintiffs' pleadings that alleged the defendants 
made uniform oral and written misrepresentations and 
determine whether the record supported their claims, and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The court also questioned, based on the representations made in the 
prospectus and prospectus wrapper, whether the plaintiffs stated a 
misrepresentation claim at all. See Appellants' Br. Ex. A at 7 & n.2 
(magistrate judge's report & recommendation). Specifically, the court 
looked to the prospectus and found that, when read as a whole, it was 
clear that it stated that either Michael Douglas or Michael Phillips would 
produce at least two movies for Cinema Plus. See id. at 7. Because 
Michael Phillips indeed produced two movies for the partnership, the 
court doubted whether there had been a misrepresentation. But, 
because the defendants had not moved for summary judgment, the court 
declined to decide the matter on this basis. See id. 
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second, whether the court determined correctly that 
reliance could not be presumed. 
 
As to the first issue, plaintiffs contend that class issues 
predominate because the defendants made uniform oral 
and written misrepresentations. Specifically, they point to 
the prospectus and argue that because they, as investors, 
are presumed to have read these materials, the defendants 
made uniform misrepresentations to all putative class 
members. Further, they point to the prospectus wrapper 
and other uniform internal marketing materials distributed 
to the brokers that also contain misrepresentations, and 
claim the brokers relied upon them in making substantially 
similar and misleading sales recommendations. The 
evidence of record, however, simply does not support the 
plaintiffs' claims. 
 
The issue, then, is whether in making a class certification 
decision the court must take as true the allegations in the 
complaint where those allegations are unsupported, and in 
some instances rebutted, by a well-developed record. 
Specifically, we must decide whether the district court erred 
in finding that notwithstanding plaintiffs' claim that the 
brokers, relying upon uniform sales materials, made 
materially similar misrepresentations, that plaintiffs' case 
actually is based on individualized misrepresentations. 
Recently, we addressed an issue of this nature in Newton 
and held that "[i]n reviewing a motion for class certification, 
a preliminary inquiry into the merits is sometimes 
necessary to determine whether the alleged claims can be 
properly resolved as a class action." Id. at 5; see Falcon, 
457 U.S. at 160, 102 S.Ct. at 2372 (stating "it may be 
necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings 
before coming to rest on the certification question"). In 
Newton, faced with claims of a "common scheme" of 
misrepresentation constituting a Rule 10b-5 private 
securities fraud claim, we held that the case presented an 
instance in which the court must probe beyond the surface 
of plaintiffs' allegations. See id. 
 
We began our analysis by examining the elements of the 
underlying cause of action, noting that such an analysis is 
critically important to the predominance determination 
under Rule 23(b)(3). See id. at *8. This is so because: 
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       the elements of the Rule 10b-5 claim which remain in 
       dispute, requiring proof of individualized reliance and 
       injury from each member of the proposed plaintiff class 
       effectively would prevent plaintiffs from proceeding with 
       a class action, since individual issues then would 
       overwhelm the common ones. On the other hand, 
       presuming these elements would resolve the problem of 
       balancing the substantive requirement of proof of 
       reliance and injury in securities cases against the 
       procedural requisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
       23. If proof of the essential elements of the cause of 
       action requires individual treatment, then class 
       certification is unsuitable. 
 
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Then, in 
considering the elements of reliance and economic injury, 
we looked to the parties' evidence and concluded, despite 
plaintiffs' allegations that they had suffered economic 
injury, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a presumption 
of class-wide injury. See id. at *15. Accordingly, we found 
that because each individual claim would have to be 
examined to ascertain whether or not there was injury, 
individual issues overwhelmed common questions among 
the class. See id. at *19. We therefore held that class 
certification inappropriate. See id. at *24. 
 
Our decision in In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 
also is instructive. There, the district court certified a class 
of plaintiffs who had purchased annuity policies based on 
the court's finding that "the gravamen of plaintiffs' claims is 
that Defendant's sales techniques and advertising 
constituted an allegedly fraudulent scheme." Id. at 138. 
However, on appeal and for the first time, plaintiffs argued 
their claims were not based on the sales presentations 
made by the defendant's agents, but rather were predicated 
on post-sale fraud and misconduct. See id. We therefore 
vacated the district court's certification order and remanded 
the matter for a redetermination of the issue utilizing the 
proper post-sale fraud allegations. See id. 
 
Nevertheless, we addressed the merits of the district 
court's certification decision. See id. at 143-50. In doing so, 
we first focused on whether there was predominance, and 
therefore commonality, among the plaintiffs' claims. See 
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id. at 144-45 ("Because common questions (commonality) 
must be established before predominance can be found, we 
turn to that element."). Relying on Georgine  and Barnes, 
two mass-tort cases, we noted that class certification was 
inappropriate in cases that present individualized issues of 
liability. See id. at 145 (citing Georgine, 83 F.3d at 610; 
Barnes, 161 F.3d at 149). In Georgine, which involved 
certification of a nationwide settlement class of persons 
exposed to asbestos, we held that the predominance 
requirement was not satisfied because "each individual 
plaintiff 's claim raises radically different factual and legal 
issues from those of other plaintiffs." Georgine, 93 F.3d at 
618. Similarly, in Barnes we affirmed the decertification of 
a class of cigarette smokers who asserted claims against a 
cigarette manufacturer, finding that the individual issues 
involved made class treatment inappropriate. See Barnes, 
161 F.3d at 149. 
 
Applying these principles, in LifeUSA we found that 
commonality did not exist, and therefore common questions 
could not predominate over individual issues. See LifeUSA, 
242 F.3d at 147. We stated that the plaintiffs' claims arose 
"not out of one single event or misrepresentation, but 
claims allegedly made to over 280,000 purchasers by over 
30,000 independent agents where the District Court found 
that the sales presentations (hence the alleged 
misrepresentations) were neither uniform nor scripted." Id. 
at 145-46. 
 
Further, we found that the district court's reliance on 
Prudential was "misplaced and unfortunate" as the factual 
backgrounds, as demonstrated through depositions, 
affidavits and declarations, were markedly different. Id. 
Unlike in Prudential, the annuity in LifeUSA was not sold 
according to standard, uniform, scripted sales 
presentations. Compare In re the Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 
Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 514 (D.N.J. 1997), 
with LifeUSA, 242 F.3d at 146. Further, the LifeUSA 
annuities were sold by independent agents who learned 
about the annuity from written materials, some of which 
were not uniform or generated by the defendant, and from 
voluntary defendant-sponsored seminars. See LifeUSA, 242 
F.3d at 146. Moreover, selling agents did not utilize the 
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marketing materials uniformly; some agents discarded the 
materials entirely while others tailored their presentations 
to each customer's objectives. See id. 
 
Finally, the plaintiffs testified that if they received 
information from the sales agents prior to purchasing 
annuities, they neither relied upon nor recalled its 
substance. See id. Therefore, we found the record to be 
"uncompromising in revealing non-standardized and 
individualized sales `pitches' presented by independent and 
different sales agents, all subject to varying defenses and 
differing state laws, thus making certification of 
individualized issues inappropriate." Id. at 147. Thus, we 
vacated the district court's certification order. See id. at 
148. 
 
In Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th 
Cir. 2001), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
helpfully discussed the issue before us. There, the district 
court certified a nationwide class of persons who had 
purchased machine tools manufactured by defendant, 
alleging that the defendant, through its agents, fraudulently 
represented the tools' abilities and limitations. See id. at 
673. In doing so, the district court assumed that because 
"class determination is made at the pleading stage of the 
action, the substantive allegations in the complaint are 
accepted as true for purposes of the class motion." Id. at 
675. Therefore, the district court rejected the defendant's 
argument that because plaintiff 's claim was based on oral 
misrepresentations, which would be different for each 
potential class member, certification was inappropriate. See 
id. 
 
On appeal, the court of appeals held that "[b]efore 
deciding whether to allow a case to proceed as a class 
action . . . a judge should make whatever factual and legal 
inquiries are necessary under Rule 23." Id.  at 676. The 
Supreme Court had recognized in Falcon that"sometimes it 
may be necessary for the court to probe beyond the 
pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question 
. . . . [A]ctual, not presumed conformance with Rule 23(a) 
remains . . . indispensable." Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160, 102 
S.Ct. at 2372. The Szabo court found the same to be true 
for Rule 23(b) as "[c]ertifying classes on the basis of 
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incontestable allegations in the complaint moves the court's 
discretion to the plaintiff 's attorneys--who may use it in 
ways injurious to other class members, as well as ways 
injurious to defendants." Szabo, 249 F.3d at 677. 
Therefore, the court vacated the district court's certification 
order, finding "[n]agging issues of choice of law, 
commonality, and manageability beset this case" as "[i]t is 
unlikely that dealers in different parts of the country said 
the same things to hundreds of different buyers." Id. 
 
Turning to this case, it is apparent that not only was it 
appropriate, but also necessary, for the district court to 
examine the factual record underlying plaintiffs' allegations 
in making its certification decision. See Newton , 2001 WL 
877524, at *5; LifeUSA, 242 F.3d at 145-48; see also 
Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676. Further, applying the framework 
utilized in Newton, it is clear the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that the record failed to 
establish that common issues predominated over individual 
issues in the case. 
 
Similar to Newton, this case involves private securities 
fraud claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. S 78j(b), although here they are raised as predicate 
acts under RICO. In order to establish their claims, 
plaintiffs must show that the defendants made 
misstatements or omissions of material fact, with scienter, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and 
that the plaintiffs injuriously relied on the misstatements or 
omissions. See, e.g., Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 
310, 315 (3d Cir. 1997); Kline v. First W. Gov't Securities, 
Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 1994). As proof of two of 
these essential elements requires individual treatment, we 
conclude class certification is unsuitable. See Newton, 2001 
WL 877524, at *8. 
 
First, plaintiffs allege the defendants made uniform oral 
and written misrepresentations. They point to the 
prospectus as evidence of a uniform written 
misrepresentation made to all plaintiffs. Further, relying on 
the marketing materials and prospectus wrapper, they 
contend that these uniform written materials establish that 
the brokers' statements were uniform, as the brokers 
certainly must have relied upon these materials in making 
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their sales presentations. The problem, however, is that the 
record simply does not support these claims. 
 
When the court made its certification decision it had 
deposition testimony or affidavits from each of the 
plaintiffs, several brokers, and a Cinema Plus investor other 
than the plaintiffs. At his deposition, plaintiff Fontaine 
testified that he did not know whether he ever had received 
a prospectus, but that even if he had, he had not read it. 
See App. at 573; id. at 645. Further, he testified that he 
made the decision to invest in Cinema Plus as a result of 
one to four conversations with his broker, but he does not 
recall what his broker told him about Cinema Plus. He 
testified, "I don't remember specifically what he said, but he 
must have mentioned to me about Cinema Plus, Michael 
Douglas, the amount of money I can make, double my 
money in three or four years. Michael Douglas was the big 
guy involved with this." Id. at 566-67. The deposition 
continued with defendants' counsel asking, "So what you 
remember about what he said concerning Michael Douglas 
was that he was the big guy and the person that was going 
to push this?" and Fontaine answering, "I assume that he 
meant to promote these movies and even act in them, I 
assumed." Id. at 567. Moreover, Fontaine denied having 
heard several representations alleged in the complaint to 
have been made as part of a uniform script read to 
investors pertaining to the risks involved in the investment. 
See id. at 599-603. 
 
Similarly, plaintiff Johnston testified at her deposition 
that she did not recall whether she received a Cinema Plus 
prospectus, and that if she had, she never read it. See id. 
at 855; id. at 873-74; id. at 891-93. Johnston did testify 
unequivocally, however, that her broker stated that Michael 
Douglas was going to produce movies for Cinema Plus. See 
id. at 849. But, she testified that she did not discuss the 
relative investment risks with her broker because he knew 
her individual tastes well enough to know that she would 
not want to take a risk. See id. at 933. 
 
Johnston's broker, Robert Kaiser, testified that he 
received some, but not all, of the alleged uniform sales 
materials, but that he did not read from or rely upon these 
materials in making investment recommendations. See id. 
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at 1029-30; id. at 1031-32; id. at 1071-72. He testified that 
instead his "typical practice [was] to make a list of bullet 
points describing the pros and cons and to go over those 
with a person," the information for which was derived from 
marketing materials, scripts and prospectuses. Id. at 1009. 
Nevertheless, he testified that he told Johnston that 
Michael Douglas was going to produce two or more movies, 
which was an important consideration regarding Cinema 
Plus's investment potential. See id. at 77-80; id. at 93-95. 
 
There were also affidavits before the court from several 
brokers who sold units of Cinema Plus stating that they did 
not use a standardized script or a uniform presentation in 
selling shares of Cinema Plus. See id. at 1387 (Aff. of John 
Jaeger) (stating his "presentation to various customers with 
respect to Cinema Plus varied depending on the individual 
circumstances of the customer and [his] relationship with 
that customer."); id. at 1390 (Aff. of David Sysko) (same); id. 
at 1392 (Aff. of Randall Carter) (same). Additionally, their 
discussions with respect to Cinema Plus varied from 
customer-to-customer depending on the questions and 
comments of the customer. See id. 
 
Finally, the court considered the affidavit of James 
Gleason, a Cinema Plus investor. He stated expressly that 
he did not base his decision to invest in Cinema Plus on 
the likelihood that a particular producer would produce 
movies for the partnership. See id. at 1379-80. Therefore, 
the record from the plaintiffs' viewpoint is at best 
inconclusive as to whether the defendants made uniform 
oral representations in selling units of Cinema Plus. 
 
In cases raising issues similar to those here, it has 
become well-settled that, as a general rule, an action based 
substantially on oral rather than written communications is 
inappropriate for treatment as a class action. See, e.g., 
LifeUSA, 242 F.3d at 145-46; Simon v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Glick v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 106 F.R.D. 446, 449 (E.D. 
Pa. 1985). For example, in Seiler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 102 
F.R.D. 880, 889 (D.N.J. 1984), the court rejected as 
insufficient plaintiffs' allegations that the brokers allegedly 
relied upon uniform marketing materials because the 
record revealed that individual brokers made individual 
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decisions about upon what to rely and what to say to 
customers. 
 
Therefore, it is clear that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in finding that individual issues overwhelmed 
issues common to the class with regard to the element of a 
misstatement or material omission. We reach this 
conclusion notwithstanding plaintiffs' reliance on 
Prudential. The plaintiffs claim that the district court 
erroneously distinguished Prudential on the ground that it 
did not involve affirmative misrepresentations. Indeed, it 
does appear that the district court took this clearly 
unsupported view of Prudential in distinguishing it from the 
present case. Compare Prudential, 148 F.3d at 310 n.48 
(finding certification of settlement class was appropriate 
where allegedly improper sales practices were carried out 
by use of "substantially similar, and sometimes identical 
oral and written misrepresentations," "the required use of 
pre-approved written marketing materials," and material 
omissions), with Appellants' Br. Ex. A at 8 (magistrate 
judge's report & recommendation) (stating Prudential 
involved only failure to disclose material facts and 
allegations that specific information was withheld from all 
investors). Nevertheless, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that Prudential was distinguishable. 
 
Prudential involved uniform, scripted and standard sales 
presentations by the defendants. See id. at 310-11. Indeed, 
in Prudential the district court found specifically that "the 
oral component of the fraudulent sales presentations did 
not vary appreciably among class members." Prudential, 
962 F. Supp. at 514. Moreover, the agents in Prudential 
were career agents who worked exclusively for and were 
trained uniformly by Prudential, and who relied on uniform 
sales materials. See id. at 514-15. Here, however, the 
plaintiffs did not establish that Cinema Plus units were sold 
according to standard, uniform, scripted sales 
presentations. This much is apparent from the starkly 
different accounts of plaintiffs Johnston and Fontaine as to 
how and why they came to invest in Cinema Plus. Further, 
the brokers denied using uniform presentations, and more 
importantly, there is no evidence that, other than Kaiser 
and Fontaine's broker, any made the alleged 
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misrepresentation about Michael Douglas at all. Finally, 
Johnston and Fontaine both testified that if they received 
written sales information or prospectuses from defendants 
prior to purchase, they did not rely on them, nor could they 
recall their substance. In this sense, this case is very 
similar to LifeUSA, where we held Prudential was 
distinguishable. See LifeUSA, 242 F.3d at 146. So, too, do 
we here. 
 
We have not overlooked our statement in Prudential that: 
 
       While individual questions may arise during the course 
       of this litigation, we agree with the district court that 
       the presence of individual questions does not per se 
       rule out a finding of predominance. In particular, the 
       `presence of individual questions as to the reliance of 
       each investor does not mean that the common 
       questions of law and fact do not predominate.' 
       Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 786 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 315. Here, however, we do not know 
the content of the individual representations as they were 
not standard or scripted but were oral and varied. 
Moreover, we do not know whether or to what extent the 
representations facilitated the sales of Cinema Plus units. 
In the circumstances, we cannot say "that questions of law 
or fact common to the members of the class predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members." Rule 
23(b)(3). We emphasize this point to demonstrate that we 
are in no sense undermining Prudential. 
 
In addition to finding this case presented individual 
questions regarding the alleged misrepresentations, the 
district court found this case involved individual questions 
of reliance. The plaintiffs dispute this finding, arguing 
instead that they are entitled to a presumption of reliance.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In addition to the argument described below, plaintiffs contend they 
are entitled to a presumption of reliance based on the "fraud of the 
market" theory. See Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986). 
The plaintiffs concede that the traditional fraud on the market theory, 
which applies where securities are traded on an open and developed 
market and the market price of the securities incorporates the 
misrepresentations, "does not technically apply here." Appellants' Br. at 
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In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 
153-54, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 1472-73 (1972), the Supreme Court 
held that in cases seeking to predicate Rule 10b-5 liability 
upon omissions, reliance will be presumed from the 
materiality of the information not disclosed. Conversely, no 
presumption arises in cases of alleged misrepresentations. 
See id.; Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 187 (3d 
Cir. 1981).7 The Court did not address, however, those 
situations involving both misrepresentations and omissions. 
 
Then, in Sharp, we held that in cases involving both 
omissions and misrepresentations, the "proper approach to 
the problem of reliance is to analyze the plaintiff 's 
allegations, in light of the likely proof at trial, and 
determine the most reasonable placement of the burden of 
proof of reliance." Id. at 188. Otherwise, to maintain in 
these cases an omission-misrepresentation dichotomy 
"would require the trial judge to instruct the jury to 
presume reliance with regard to omitted facts, and not to 
presume reliance with regard to the misrepresented facts." 
Id. By examining the plaintiffs' allegations and likely proof, 
however, the court can decide, on a case by case basis, 
whether the offenses can be characterized primarily as 
omissions or misrepresentations, and therefore who most 
appropriately bears the burden of proof. See id.  
 
Applying the foregoing methodology, we concluded in 
Sharp that plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption of 
reliance. See id. at 189. There, plaintiffs brought a 
securities fraud action against an accounting firm that 
issued an opinion letter containing representations about 
the deductibility of an investment. See id. at 178. The court 
found that the opinion letter was intended to influence the 
decisions of persons interested in the investment, and that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. Nevertheless, they urge us to expand the theory to instances, such 
as here, where the investment was sold during a closed period and the 
initial price was set by the issuer rather than the market. See id. We 
need not address this issue, however, as plaintiffs failed to raise it 
before 
the district court. 
 
7. Sharp has been overruled on grounds not material here. See McCarter 
v. Mitcham, 883 F.2d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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the defendant undoubtedly foresaw that it would have that 
effect. See id. at 189. Because the defendant "facilitated the 
transactions at issue but failed to disclose certain facts," 
and considering the likelihood that investors would rely on 
the opinion letter, the court held that the burden of proving 
reliance appropriately was placed on defendant. See id. 
 
Similarly, in Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 
903 F.2d 186, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1990), we applied the Sharp 
analysis and concluded the plaintiffs were entitled to a 
presumption of reliance. We found the case was predicated 
on two allegedly fraudulent courses of conduct by 
defendant: the failure to disclose excessive markups in 
their purchases and sales of various penny stocks and the 
failure to clarify true but misleading statements made 
about its research department, namely that the department 
consisted of one person who assembled information only 
about companies whose securities the defendant had 
underwritten. See id. at 202. The first of defendant's 
actions involved pure omissions, making the Affiliated Ute 
presumption fully applicable. See id. The second action 
involved half-truths, which we held were "obviously closer 
to omissions than are `pure' misrepresentations," and that 
would foreseeably influence investors' decisions. Id. 
Therefore, we held the district court did not err in"excusing 
plaintiffs from their burden of proving reliance on those 
nondisclosures and half-truths." Id. 
 
More recently, in Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1162- 
63 (10th Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit addressed the issue, holding the plaintiff was not 
entitled to a presumption of reliance. The plaintiff, an 
aftermarket purchaser of debentures, brought a securities 
fraud action alleging the seller misrepresented its financial 
outlook and disseminated false information about the 
company. See id. at 1162. The court expressly adopted the 
Sharp analysis and "analyze[d] the complaint to determine 
whether the offenses it alleges can be characterized 
primarily as omissions or misrepresentations in order to 
determine whether the Affiliated Ute presumption should 
apply." Id. In doing so, the court noted that the analysis 
was easier to describe than to apply because "every 
misstatement both advances false information and omits 
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truthful information. Statements which are technically true 
may be so incomplete as to be misleading (e.g., half-truths 
or distortions)." Id. 
 
Nevertheless, keeping in mind the principle that the 
"presumption of reliance exists in the first place to aid 
plaintiffs when reliance on a negative would be practically 
impossible to prove," the court looked at the allegations in 
the complaint and found that the plaintiff primarily alleged 
misrepresentations. Id. at 1162-63. For example, the 
complaint alleged that the defendant "consistently omitted 
to disclose that its financial statements had been falsified 
and that its sales, revenues, assets and shareholders' 
equity had been artificially inflated. Defendants concealed 
the existence of the unlawful scheme and the acts of 
manipulation committed pursuant thereto." Id.  at 1163. 
 
Finally, the court concluded by noting that "[a]ny 
fraudulent scheme requires some degree of concealment, 
both of the truth and of the scheme itself," and that the 
mere fact of this concealment cannot, and should not, 
transform a misrepresentation into an omission. Id. "To do 
otherwise would permit the Affiliated Ute presumption to 
swallow the reliance requirement almost completely." Id. 
 
Applying Sharp to this case, we find that plaintiffs' 
allegations are based on misrepresentations, rather than 
omissions, by defendants. Their primary claim is that the 
defendants misrepresented that Michael Douglas would 
participate in the production of two to four films for Cinema 
Plus. This claim should not be transformed into an 
omission simply because the defendants failed to disclose 
that the allegedly misleading fact was untrue. Under an 
approach of that nature nearly any misrepresentation could 
become an omission, which, as the Joseph court noted, 
would allow the presumption to swallow the reliance 
requirement almost completely. See id. Further, the 
omission alleged would have no impact absent the 
misrepresentation, or in other words, a misrepresentation is 
necessary to create the specific expectation that the 
omission does not negate. Here, defendants' failure to 
inform plaintiffs that Michael Douglas was not under 
contract to produce movies for Cinema Plus is meaningless 
without the representation that Douglas would produce 
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movies. Finally, this case is not one where reliance would 
be difficult for the plaintiffs to prove, while it would be 
extraordinarily difficult for the defendants to disprove, as 
presumably plaintiffs know whether they acted on or as a 
result of the information made available to them. 
 
We emphasize that in reaching our result we have taken 
into account our decisions in Sharp and Hoxworth. There, 
we were presented with situations similar to that here, 
namely failures to clarify misleading statements, but held 
that the plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption of 
reliance. See Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at 202; Sharp, 649 F.2d 
at 189. In so holding, we looked to whether the defendants' 
actions facilitated the transactions, and whether it was 
foreseeable that defendants' actions would influence the 
plaintiffs' decisions. See Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at 202; Sharp, 
649 F.2d at 189. Here, arguably defendants' 
representations that Michael Douglas would produce two to 
four films facilitated the sale of Cinema Plus units and 
influenced plaintiffs to invest therein. However, Sharp and 
Hoxworth are distinguishable in that in both cases we 
found the alleged misstatements and half-truths were 
uniform. In Hoxworth, the defendant's brokers "were 
trained to solicit new business in a carefully scripted 
sequence of three consecutive phone calls made to 
prospective customers." Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at 192. 
Similarly, in Sharp, all of the plaintiffs received the 
misleading opinion letter written by defendant. See Sharp, 
649 F.2d at 178. Here, there is neither a finding, nor 
evidence upon which we reasonably could find, that the 
brokers utilized, and the plaintiffs received, a uniform sales 
pitch or uniform representations regarding investing in 
Cinema Plus. Therefore, it is questionable whether, or to 
what extent, the alleged misrepresentation facilitated or 
influenced the sales of Cinema Plus units. Accordingly, we 
find that the district court did not err in concluding 
plaintiffs were not entitled to a presumption of reliance, and 
therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding the 
plaintiffs failed to establish the predominance requirement 




In light of the foregoing discussion, we need not discuss 
the superiority requirement at length. A class action must 
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represent the best "available method[ ] for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3). It is within this requirement that the court should 
address "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the 
management of a class action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
The district court concluded that given the individualized 
nature of proving misrepresentations and reliance, the case 
would present "unsurmountable" manageability problems. 
The court found that "[a]ssuming that the representative 
plaintiffs are typical of all plaintiffs, individual inquiry 
would be necessary with respect to each class member 
concerning their receipt of the prospectus, whether they 
read it, and whether they relied upon it." Appellants' Br. 
Ex. A at 9 (magistrate judge's report & recommendation). 
Because of the number of potential class members, the 
court held that a trial involving this amount of individual 
inquiry would be impracticable. See id. at 10. As the 
foregoing discussion demonstrates, we conclude the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this decision. 
Trial of this case would involve essentially countless mini- 
trials to determine what alleged misrepresentation was 
made to each individual plaintiff, whether that person relied 
upon the statement, and the applicability of any defenses. 
Obviously, establishing proof of each of these elements and 





In sum, we affirm the district court's order entered 
November 22, 2000, denying class certification. Although 
the plaintiffs allege uniform written and oral 
misrepresentations by defendants, they failed to 
substantiate their claims. Further, the district court 
properly concluded plaintiffs were not entitled to a 
presumption of reliance. Therefore, adjudication of 
plaintiffs' claims necessarily would require an 
individualized analysis of each claim, including the form of 
the misrepresentation, whether it was relied upon, and the 
availability of any defenses. Clearly, individual issues 
predominate over issues common to the class and the class 
action is not the superior method of adjudicating this case. 
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Therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying certification here. 
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